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Introduction 
The Creative Wasteland of 
Post-Industrial Society 
The global financial crisis of 2008 signaled the beginning of the end of the post­
industrial age. The prolonged stagnation that followed 2008-accompanied by 
sovereign debt, low productivity and high unemployment in major economies-was 
an indication of the failure of many of the claims that had been made since the 
1970s about the economic power of post-industrial economies and knowledge 
societies. Economic failure translated into fiscal contraction. This affected all 
kinds of government spending including on a super-sized university sector. During 
the post-modern era, mass higher education had grown ferociously. Philosophies 
of post-industrialism legitimated a relentless expansion of government budgets 
for education along with other social sectors. The resulting levels of sovereign 
debt and government budget deficits were not sustainable-not least because the 
economic promise of post-industrial economies was never realized. 
The promise of post-industrialism was innovation. The primary cause of modem 
economic growth, the theory went, was innovation. Innovation is the social application 
of the power of creation. Modern societies that lack the capacity for creation struggle 
socially and flounder economically. The theory was not wrong. The extended economic 
stagnation in many OECD countries that followed 2008 was a symptom of depressed 
innovation. But this despondent state pointed to a deeper problem: namely that the 
post-industrial 'knowledge society' and the post-modem 'information society' had 
stopped innovating on a large scale--or rather it had never lived up to its self-image 
as an innovating epoch. The 'bio technology revolution' that was promised in the 
1990s failed to happen. The 2000s saw mass consumer enthusiasm for social media, 
computer applications and smart phones. Yet the last significant productivity increase 
in the OECD occurred in the late 1990s and that was short-lived. The university was 
the symbolic core of the post-modem age. It embodied its desires. It represented its 
aspirations. It was emblematic of the knowledge and information that, supposedly, 
elicited the technological and sociological innovations that energized economies and 
enlarged social prosperity. It was an institutional source of concepts that animated and 
unscored the ideas-driven growth that supposedly typified post-industrial economies. 
Yet in reality growth, prosperity and ideas proved to be much scarcer than in the 
industrial age. 
Part of the explanation of this is bureaucracy. The post-modem age promised to 
replace inflexible 'Fordist' organizations with flexible 'post-Fordist' institutions. 
In reality, post-Fordism out-did Fordism in its fascination with administration. 
This was, above all, true of universities. Post-modem bureaucratic organization 
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contributed much to the failure of contemporary innovation and the paltry nature 
of its idea-generation. Large and medium-sized organizations dominate today's 
economic and social landscape. Yet, whatever their virtues, these organizations are 
typically poor innovators and miserable concept-producers. Smaller enterprises and 
informal milieu for the most part are better at substantive innovation and genuine 
creation. That does not stop large formal organizations touting their innovation 
prowess in ways that are both self-serving and self-deluding. A specious rhetoric of 
innovation deployed by bureaucratic organizations and bureaucratic societies took 
off in the early 1970s. This coincided with the rapid expansion of universities. The 
peak of social discussion about universities occurs in the period between 1967 and 
1974.1 This was one of the harbingers of the post-modem society. The effect of this 
interest and its concomitant rhetoric was perverse. It contributed to hollowing out 
the inner substance of innovation and creation while appropriating its legitimating 
properties. Large organizations not least of all the ever-expanding universities 
proclaimed (without much evidence) their own impressive novelty and freshness. 
This shameless booster mentality belied an underlying reality of exhaustion and 
entropy. All round there was much sound and fury that signified nothing. 
Modem economies are cyclical. The most important cycles are the long 
economic waves. These last 70-80 years and define the world's mega-trends. We 
have just come to the conclusion of one of those waves. It began in 1950 and 
ended in 2010. It started on an upswing and terminated in chronic stagnation. 
There were good times during the era but sluggish periods as well. Some of the 
good times hid bad practices. Consequently a good portion of the wealth created in 
the 1990s and the 2000s was fictional. It was the product of speculation rather than 
ingenuity and hard work. The overlapping long economic waves of 1900-1970 
and 1950-2010 were notably less impressive in real terms than the waves of 
1780-1870 and 1850-1920. While the global economy is wealthier today than it 
was in the nineteenth century, its creative energy is less. 
Where do we go from here? W hat can help restart the stalled engine of creation 
and re-engage_yet another long cycle of creative capitalism? Can the spirit of the 
nineteenth century be recaptured, or will the world's next long economic wave 
prove to be more down than up? The answer to that question lies in one word: 
productivity. Productivity is the child of creativity. The secret of modem industrial 
capitalism was to create more with less. To achieve more with less, science was 
applied to production, commerce was freed from government bureaucracy, the 
work ethic spread, and social institutions were stream-lined. In the twentieth 
century, a counter-thrust occurred. Late twentieth-century science was consumed 
by the art of grant-getting and rent-seeking. State capitalism rose to prominence. 
Hedonistic and remissive behaviors were widely sanctioned while increased 
regulation petrified flexible institutions. 
The idea of social and geographical mobility driven by education, and culminating 
in 'going to university,' proved to be one of the most powerful post-second world 
1 Google N-gram analysis of the terms 'university' and 'universities.' 
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war ideologies. Across the OECD, 30 percent or more of 19-year olds now attend 
tertiary institutions. Ready access to higher education prevails. The underlying 
assumption is that education-fuelled social and geographic mobility is ennobling. 
It emancipates human beings from a life of labor and enriches the mind. But does 
it? Students often acquire proficient professional knowledge in contemporary 
universities yet these same universities now also often bore the brightest students. 
At the same time, 25 percent of students drop out of university permanently without 
completing a degree. 2 Another 25 percent of students graduate but never work in a 
job requiring a degree. While the post-industrial universities redefined themselves 
as vehicles of social and spatial mobility, their ability to satisfy the most inquiring 
minds or produce path-breaking work diminished, as did their vocational salience. 
This kind of unseemly roundabout was not peculiar to universities. It haunted 
much of the electronic age. A peculiar ambivalence beset the era. It saw out 
socialism and communism. Both were dead ducks by 1989. But the age could not 
let go of their asphyxiating legacy. So it turned from anti-capitalism to various 
kinds of faux capitalism. A legion of fauxitalisms mushroomed. These were 
encouraged by government subsidies, preternaturally-low interest rate policies 
and ideologically-inspired regulatory environments. The financial crisis of 2008 
signaled the beginning of the end of the post-industrial age. We are starting to 
look back on it now. What we see in hindsight should inform the future. Times do 
pivot and behaviors do change. We cannot foretell the future but should the future 
tum out better than the past this will be because we have learnt something from 
experience. We do not know what the next economic wave will be. It is being 
invented right now. The open question isF whether, as a result, the creativity slump 
of the post-modem era will be overcome or not? 
Post-modem sin was two-fold. First, it was not to go to university. Second it 
was not to invest large amounts of private and public money in the vain pursuit 
that everyone should attend a college or university. Accordingly, the higher 
education sector attracted untold billions in tax-payer funds and student fees. 
Yet what it delivered to millions of individuals and the larger society was paltry. 
Drop-out rates were intractably high. On a mass scale, these rates were socially 
and financially unsustainable.3 A quarter to nearly a half of graduates ended up in 
2 In 2011, the comparative figure for the United Kingdom (one of the world's better 
performers) was 21.6 percent. Paton 2012. The OECD, 2007, Table A3.4, calculated that 
72 percent of Australian university students completed (28 percent didn't) by measuring 
graduates as a percent of entrants for the year. The OECD average, on this measure, was 69 
percent completion. The United States had 56 percent completion and the United Kingdom 
79 percent completion. The OECD, 20 Ba: 68, reported completion rates of 80 percent 
(Denmark), 74 percent (Germany), 66 percent (Israel), 64 percent (USA), 59 percent 
(Norway), and 47 percent (Hungary). Australia's rate in 2013 (81 percent) was arbitrarily 
high due to rapidly growing entry numbers. 
3 In 2013, 37 million Americans (about one in 10) had some college credits but had 
not completed a degree. 
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jobs that did not require a degree.4 Chronic grade inflation diluted the meaning of 
entry scores and performance results. After 1970, real research output per capita 
declined visibly and the rate of high-level creation diminished noticeably. Major 
breakthroughs in key areas from physics to medicine contracted. 
When it comes to analyzing the universities, the current study draws principally 
on evidence and examples from Australia and the United States. The latter is a 
diverse higher education system with both public and private institutions; the 
former is a predominately state university system. The American system is large 
and leads the world; the Australian system is small but is strong academically 
and is a major exporter of higher education internationally. Yet both face serious 
systemic problems-as do university systems across the world. The problem lies 
not with this or that country but in the nature of the university and especially 
what became of it in the post-industrial era. The university was the signature 
institution of the post-industrial age. The age reaped what it sowed. As the last 
long economic wave unfolded between 1950 and 2010, universities expanded 
remorselessly. As they did, their intellectual productivity declined. They become 
massively bureaucratized. Their information technology proved dysfunctional. 
Central costs ballooned while governments mercilessly drove large numbers of 
young people who had no interest in and no aptitude for university curriculum into 
the universities. Today the clear evidence is that half of university entrants show 
no improvement in reasoning or understanding across their first and second year. 
In effect, they learn nothing. Half also either drop out of university or else are 
never employed in a job that requires a degree. What would we say of a factory 
that produced 50 percent unusable widgets? We would say it had a productivity 
problem. All the serious empirical indicators suggest that too many young people 
today go to university or degree-granting colleges not too few, and that the raison 
d'etre of universities has been lost amidst a fog of fake social pieties, insipid 
intellectual activity, and illusory promises of social advancement. 
Governments funded the remorseless expansion of the universities.5 In doing 
so, they createdproblems that they could not afford to fix. They raised expectations 
that more and more young people would go to university, far in excess of population 
growth. None of this was sustainable.6 So governments did one of three things. 
4 Forty-eight percent of US college graduates in 2012 were in jobs that did not require 
a degree. Vedder, Denhart and Robe 2013. 
5 The breathlessness of government reports that hailed the expansion began early 
on. In 1964 Australia's Martin Committee reported that 'since the end of World War II, 
there has been a revolution in the interest in higher education in Australia' (volume 1: 12) 
inciting images of an implacable flow that all subsequent government inquiries would in 
turn summon up. The separation between fact and norm blurred. The Martin Committee was 
the second of Australia's major official inquiries into its universities in the post-war period. 
6 In 1947 Australia spent 0.11 percent of its GDP on the universities; in 1962 this 
had risen to 0.67 percent (Martin Committee 1964 volume l: 13). In 2011, the expenditure 
was 1 percent. In 1947 the outgoing was fiscally inconsequential. In 2011 it was fiscally 
noticeable and thus subject to political considerations. 
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They borrowed the money to fund university places, exacerbating long-term 
public debt problems. They introduced 'fees-and-loans' packages for students, 
creating unproductive private debt for the many students who would eventually 
drop out of university or never use their degree in a job. Finally, governments 
systematically underfunded student places. This careless system undermined the 
intellectual productivity of the university in the name of expanding the university. 
It financed millions of people to learn approximately nothing while those who 
were in a position to seriously benefit from a university education were habitually 
short-changed by the skimpy curricula and ballooning size of the mass university. 
The post-industrial era stimulated a raging social appetite for higher education. 
In the wake of this, the word 'university' became a synonym for virtually any kind 
of tertiary education of any description. The university subsumed the college, the 
technological institute, the seminary, the gallery school, the conservatorium, and 
the sports team. In so doing it radically expanded the range and (more importantly) 
the type of discipline it offered. Management, media, and business 'studies' joined 
physics, economics and philosophy in the university. Yet it remained an open 
question whether the four-year undergraduate university degree was a suitable 
replacement for on-the-job training in the para-professions such as journalism or 
social work. Nevertheless, the status of the word 'university' is very seductive. 
As a consequence the institution of the university has continued to proliferate 
inexorably while the universities on average have become more and more trivial 
in their spirit and practice. A handful of universities escape this fate. Most do not. 
Universities are defined by three great functions. One is to transmit knowledge 
in order to provide students with an understanding of the humanities, the sciences or 
the social sciences. The second function is to transmit know ledge in order to prepare 
students for a learned profession. The third and highest function of the university is 
to create knowledge. The university thus is defined by the advancement as well as 
the transmission of knowledge. A university that advances knowledge is different 
from a humanistic college or a vocational institute. The latter principally convey 
knowledge rather than create it. The discovery university (the type of university 
that advances knowledge) relies on high levels of self-education and intellectual 
modelling. A firmer or clearer distinction between the discovery university (on the 
one hand) and the humanistic college or the technological institute (on the other 
hand) might help to resolve some of the conundrums that we currently face as a 
consequence of the repeated inflation of the concept of the university. We cannot 
escape the simple reality, though, that a large portion of what today is called 'the 
university' is not a university at all. 
The problem is not new. The modern idea and practice of the university took 
shape in the nineteenth century. What resulted from that was an institution (even 
then) whose self-understanding and practices were ambivalent and conflicted. 
The American university scene of the late-nineteenth century had all the features 
in miniature of what was to come. It was tom between vocational and scholarly 
study, undergraduate and graduate missions, professional schools and the liberal 
arts and sciences, the advancement of knowledge and the diffusion of knowledge, 
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professional training and intellectual calling, pure and applied knowledge, wide 
curricula choice and narrow disciplinary specialization. It prepared students for 
the learned professions (originally divinity, law and medicine) while opening the 
university to vocations that aspired to professional status. Programs for musicians, 
dieticians, pharmacists, teachers, veterinarians, social workers and business 
administrators sprang up. Some of the new professions, like engineering, matched 
the intellectual demands of law and medicine; others struggled (and still struggle) 
for credibility. And the question of how the 'lower faculties' related to the 'higher 
faculties,' how philosophy related to law, or science to engineering, or the liberal 
arts to the professions was never resolved. Did a new discipline like that of business 
belong in a professional 'school' or in a 'college' of liberal arts and sciences? What 
in any event was the relation or separation between the words 'school,' 'college,' 
'institute,' and 'university'? 
Overall, 'the university' belies its name. It has evolved as a disjointed and 
jumbled institution, with a fractured identity, often united by one thing only: the 
desire to grow ever-larger. The post-industrial era exacerbated and compounded 
this tendency, often radically. Excess was its middle name. The consequence of 
the post-modem age was to blur still further the idea of the university. It did this 
on a very large, concerted scale. It accelerated and magnified a process that turned 
the university into the multiversity and then into the megaversity. The institution 
of the university became all things to all people. Distinctions between training 
providers, colleges, polytechnics, technological institutes and universities blurred. 
Intellectual goals vied with social goals and vocational goals and expansionary 
goals. This all gelled with the conceptual relativism of the age. Haziness, confusion, 
and muddle reigned. 
The. post-industrial age witnessed some counter tendencies. Between 1974 
and 2004, across the world, the term 'research university' gained ground.7 Self­
described 'research universities' began to assert their identity. Since the creation 
of the University of Berlin in 1810, there had been a presumption that a university 
was a place where research happened and knowledge was advanced. Yet this idea 
of the university always sat uneasily with collegiate-style teaching universities and 
vocational-style technological universities along with the professional 'schools' 
and undergraduate 'colleges' of universities, and a myriad other half-way houses, 
suggesting that the idea of the university has been one of the most contested and 
confused ideas in modernity. Everyone one desires the status that research confers 
because only a relative handful of the members of a university routinely produce 
research. Not only that but also a tiny number of universities produce most of the 
world's academic research. The sudden emergence (in the mid-2000s) of global 
rankings of universities merely highlighted this. While at the other end of the 
spectrum new versions of the 'vocational university' proliferated (especially in 
East Asia) whose rationale was that graduates would get 'jobs.' In between these 
two poles sit most universities who are uncertain of their identity and who rely on 
7 Google N-gram word analysis search. 
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vague notions of' scholarship' to bridge what is for most purposes an unbridgeable 
gap between intellectual discovery and job training. Most of these institutions 
claim to do research but in practice produce little of it. All in all, that suggests 
the need for a more affirmative and systematic distinction between the discovery 
university, the humanistic arts-and-sciences college and the technological institute. 
'Polytechnic,' 'technical college,' 'college of advanced education' and 
'institute of technology' are still today much more accurate words to describe 
many of the institutions that are called 'universities,' no matter that these labels 
have fallen into disuse. The astute US Carnegie classification of research, doctoral, 
and comprehensive universities indicates the difficulty of answering the question: 
'what is a university?' Research universities give priority to faculty carrying out 
research; doctoral universities have at least a number of major doctoral programs 
but without an emphasis on faculty research; comprehensive universities offer 
graduate research degrees to Masters' level. Is a university then defined by 
the conduct of research or can it be defined by the quasi-teaching function of 
supervising graduate research students? 
The confusion of naming has been caused in no small measure by the social 
desire to expand universities. By the mid-2000s, this expansionary impulse had 
turned into a hubristic ambition that 30, 40 or 50 percent or more of 19 year­
olds attend university. This was invariably tied to post-industrial claims about 
achieving 'equity' in higher education; claims that only ever produce ever-larger 
equity bureaucracies, never ever-greater equity. Post-industrial equations of 
degree-granting with the advancement of learning (in turn) with the advancement 
of knowledge (in tum) with economic advancement proved a chimera. The 
post-industrial era achieved little more than the proliferation and inflation of 
qualifications and the moral disenfranchisement of those without them. Post­
industrial higher education promised social equality but more commonly produced 
unrepresentative, obsequious, and morally-smug meritocracies whose actual merit 
was difficult to determine. It acted as a model for the wider bureaucratization of 
social systems in general and the zealous over-extension of procedural rationality 
in society. The post-industrial university failed to deliver on any of its social equity 
talk. Its failures then became the justification for repeating more of the same. After 
1970, universities promised to match the percentage oflow socio-economic status 
(SES) student enrolments with the proportion oflow SES individuals in the general 
population. Forty years on, the universities had failed to do this almost completely. 
All that equity policy did was to generate university equity bureaucracies in 
which university graduates were employed. This was a microcosm of a wider 
social phenomenon that saw the multiplication of public spending on procedure 
and process and the consequent proliferation of null offices with exorbitant titles 
occupied by graduates to no good social effect. 
More compelling than the self-interested promises of equity bureaucracies is 
the auto-poietic model of educational attainment. Bureaucracies seek procedural 
and institutional solutions to problems that cannot be solved by organizational 
means. Advancement to university is a classic example of this. Institutional policy 
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techniques such as lowering or manipulating entrance requirements, setting 
entrance quotas, multiplying the number of places in universities, offering special 
(aka non-meritocratic) scholarships and income support, and so on, make little 
or no difference to social outcomes. This is because advancing to university is 
not a generic social process but rather a socio-intellectual one. The single most 
powerful predictor that an individual will get to university is not parental status, 
income or occupation. It is the size of the home library that a child has access 
to. If one wants to attain equity of entry to higher education then the familial­
bibliophilic model of educational attainment is a more realistic way of achieving 
this. This is comparable with the efficacious role that self-education plays in the 
lives and careers of creative individuals in the arts, sciences and the professions. 
Rather than bureaucratically-driven 'access' programs, bibliophilic programs 
that support reading at home (such as investing in public libraries) are more 
effective in achieving broad educational success. There is good reason as well for 
skepticism about bureaucratically-delivered schooling. Bibliophilic self-education 
combined with familial inculcation of time-management and other key behavioral 
and character traits is central to getting to and succeeding at universities. Post­
industrial obsessions not only with schooling but also with social media have 
endangered this. There is a close correlation between the pervasive rise of social 
media and the critical collapse in hours spent reading at home in recent times. Just 
as institutionalized schooling is no guarantee of learning, equally questionable is 
the proposition that 'more places at universities' means 'more social opportunity' 
and' greater life chances.' In reality, 'more places' in the post-industrial universities 
has simply meant less and less learning going on in those institutions. The post­
industrial equation of ever-higher formal levels of education with better learning 
outcomes, better graduate incomes, and better economic performance or social 
prosperity is fallacious. For the present, the mythologies of the post-industrial 
society keep social demand for university places in OECD countries high. But 
myths are not forever and realistic questions keep being raised: How can demand, 
outcomes and the fact of shrinking government budgets be reconciled? How (then) 
are scarce public resources to be allocated? 
If resources are scarce, to whom or what should those resources flow? This 
is a classic question of public policy. What criteria do we have to help us choose 
between what we spend money on and what we don't spend money on? There is 
reason to consider sympathetically the criterion of discovery. Discovery is a public 
good. Done in a serious way it produces tangible, long-term, collective social 
value. It represents the human capacity for initiating, preserving, inventing and 
finding what is significant. Discovery, though, is not a populist criterion. While 
the fruits of discovery are widely shared, the human talent for discovery is not 
broadly distributed in society. Psychological studies of creativity and intelligence 
persistently conclude the same: around 8 percent of the population has a clear and 
evident gift for intellectual discovery. Around 16 percent of the population will 
end up in the professions and the semi-professions (combined) and that cohort 
benefits from some kind of higher education (though it may not be a university 
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education in the strict sense of the word university).8 A similar percentage of 19 
year olds are 'college-ready'-meaning that there is a high probability that they 
will successfully complete their tertiary studies. Discovery is not for everyone. 
The modest-sized discovery cohort is proficient at abstract thinking, reasoning, 
and speculation. It is comfortable with university-level curricula. It works with a 
substantial degree of intellectual autonomy and self-direction. 
At the highest level, what results from informed self-direction-namely, 
invention, innovation, and initiative-is generated by a small number ofresearchers, 
writers, scientists, technologists, artists, political actors, policy makers, and 
leaders of the professions whose work, by its nature, is publicly communicated 
and widely diffused. There is an outward in-principle reason for society to support 
higher education especially of the 8 percent discovery cohort, and most especially 
its 2 percent high-performing core, because what that cohort creates has a general, 
transferable and durable social value. That said, though, post-industrial subsidies 
(as the current study shows) over time have only made higher education more 
expensive not more accessible. In other words, state subsidies in practice have 
been counter-productive and self-defeating. In the post-2008 era, scarce public 
finances can be best and most effectively used for limited, targeted, merit-defined 
support of higher education and principally of discovery universities. 
The size of the discovery university sector is inherently small.9 Historically 
the university sector as a whole was small as were universities as institutions. The 
8 Australia's Martin Committee (1964 volume I: 12) asked in passing the useful 
question: 'Should the nation make facilities available to all students wishing to become 
doctors or engineers or lawyers, if it is doubtful whether the community will need this 
number?' 
9 This view may be contrasted with that of Australia's Martin Committee. In 1964, the 
Committee stated that: 'Some of [the] disadvantages of large institutions are inevitable and 
they should be set against the possible advantages of size. The truth is that there cannot be an 
optimum university size, for there are no agreed criteria against which to judge size' (volume 
I: 54). However, if the extent of discovery, productivity, and efficiency are the agreed criteria, 
then a 'large' university is not optimum. It is notable that the Protestant universities that were 
the engines of the European Enlightenment were small institutions. A case in point is the 
Scottish Enlightenment. Its great universities, the University of Glasgow and the University of 
Edinburgh, in the eighteenth century had 400 and 600 students respectively, about I percent of 
their cities populations. These universities led the way in philosophy and medicine, harbouring 
figures like Hume and Hutchenson, Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson while the southern 
counterparts of these institutions, the much larger Oxford and Cambridge universities, were 
in the doldrums. (Instructively, Adam Smith cut short his stay at Oxford where he had gone 
to carry out private scholarship on a very generous post-graduate Scottish scholarship.) Size 
is not the only cause of university lethargy but it is a factor. A city or region with a population 
of I million warrants a university with a student population of I 0,000 students. That is around 
the maximum size of a proficient university today. Six-to-eight thousand students is the 
optimal size for a contemporary university. Significantly larger growth engenders progressive 
entropy, beginning with disproportionate transaction and process costs. Structural factors like 
multiple campuses magnify entropic cost growth. 
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importance of this is unchanged. The future of the sector lies not with themegaversity 
or the multiversity but with the microversity. The demands of the microversity 
on the public purse are properly modest. It is defined by a visible and tangible 
commitment to intellectual discovery and by a distinctive style of autodidactic 
exploration-based learning. This mode of education supposes motivated self­
learners who advance in their studies via a vast range of extra curricula intellectual 
activities and through the medium of exploratory research-based essays, artistic 
works, science experiments, and theses. The latter are supervised by a professoriate 
that provides both undergraduate students and graduate candidates with visible 
and credible models of imaginative research and inspired discovery. Competitive 
scholarships are the most effective means available to governments to support 
and fund discovery-based higher learning. A system of scholarships-awarded on 
the basis of scholastic and creative aptitude tests--can properly underwrite both 
full fellowships and subsidized university places. The rationale for the state and 
society doing this is that discovery is a clear and demonstrable public good from 
which all, including future generations, benefit. 
The discovery sector is tiny. It is not for every student who might benefit from 
higher education. The technological institute and the humanistic college naturally 
complement the discovery university. Those who might benefit from some type of 
higher education are the college-ready 16 percent who have a good probability of 
completing a degree or working in a vocation that requires a degree. This applies 
to around half or less of the number of students today in higher education. Higher 
education is a mixed private and public good. For graduates, a higher education 
provides intellectual self-enrichment and leads to professional, skilled para­
professional and office work as well as higher incomes on graduation and higher 
social status. For employers higher education sorts aspirant employees. The state's 
responsibility is limited in most cases. The exception is the exceptionally talented 
whose capacity for intellectual discovery and professional initiative provide a 
manifest long-term public and social benefit. 
The publi� purse is not unlimited. It should not encourage over-education, as 
today, with millions of students enrolling in higher education with faint chance 
either of graduating or ever working in a job that requires a degree. Loans for 
tertiary study-repaid as a taxable percentage of graduate income-are an efficient 
way for able individuals to pay for a university place, allowing them to defer 
payment of fees and expenses until they are working. The over-expansion of the 
post-industrial university, though, created ballooning student debt. A large number 
of those who are indebted gain no rational private benefit from this debt. Student 
debt today has started to become a cause of marriage postponement, home loan 
unaffordability, and delay in the beginning of families. It also eats into the modest 
capital needed for garage-scale business start-ups. This suggests that not more but 
fewer university places per capita are needed. University places cannot replace 
jobs nor can they replace workplace apprenticeships, traineeships, cadetships, 
paid internships, and small business start-ups. The latter are more valuable now 
to those wanting to enter the workforce than the ever-decreasing marginal returns 
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of ever-more university places, be these privately or publicly funded. The proper 
principal function of public policy is to aid in the creation of jobs, not university 
places. The chief economic illusion of the post-industrial age was that the latter 
could replace, stimulate, and generate the former. 
The carrying-out of research defines a university. Yet most post-industrial 
universities produce meagre amounts of research. They are in reality teaching 
institutions, i.e. de facto colleges or institutes. They principally function to 
transmit knowledge, not to create knowledge. Even then their rates of retention 
of undergraduate students are often poor and their record of graduate employment 
placement is mediocre. In the post-industrial era, non-academic professional and 
administrative costs grew from 40 percent to 70 percent of university budget 
spending while university performance measured against key indictors remained 
static or declined. Most serious of all, the models of post-industrialism promised 
the vitalization of creative economies and societies. The converse occurred. Per 
capita rates of discovery in the arts and the sciences declined _in the post-industrial 
era. Fewer major works of note were produced compared with earlier historical 
periods. Political concern with providing more and more university places had 
detrimental effects. It muddied the social goal of advancing knowledge. It moved 
focus away from high-level creation and discovery-even when (in doing so) it 
deployed the rhetoric of creation and discovery. OECD countries in 2008 were 
less creative and less proficient in the arts and sciences than they were in 1908. By 
way of illustration, the US rate per capita of patent registration peaked in 19 14. 
Since the discovery of the DNA double helix by Crick and Watson in 1953, the per 
capita number of high-level science breakthroughs has diminished markedly. The 
half-life of contemporary scientific knowledge is short-meaning its obsolescence 
factor is high. Much of its experimental results are never verified and the failure 
rate of retested results is also high. While universities expanded massively during 
the post-industrial era, per capita research productivity inversely declined. No 
more than 20 percent of 'teaching and research' academics in OECD universities 
routinely produce research, even if most relish the kudos and social status of a 
discovery university. 
A common theme highlighted by extant studies and biographical accounts of 
creative figures in the arts, sciences and the professions is self-education. High-level 
creators flourish when they have access to first-class libraries and laboratories and 
first-class intellectual models. Together, these provide a powerful context for the 
adventive mind. The twin imperatives of self-education and intellectual modelling 
animate the forms, structures, expectations and needs of the autodidactic discovery 
university. Its overarching goal is discovery. Its meaning and motion derive from 
this goal. A university of this kind provides its students with an apprenticeship in 
discovery. There are many techniques for achieving this. Large libraries, broad 
curricula, interdisciplinary freedom, one-on-one research-based tutorials, small 
seminars, public lecture series, project-based learning, research-based assessment, 
and student-staff societies are common examples. Most important though is a 
pervading ethos of inspired objectivation. The auto-poietic university is a place for 
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learning how and witnessing how the act of creation takes place. That requires the 
direct observation of acts of discovery as they happen, as professors write books, 
conceive experiments, give papers, submit articles, posit artworks, and profess 
fresh ideas. 
Discovery universities are small in size and number. They are devoted to 
vigorous intellectual discovery through self-directed pedagogy and research. 
The discovery university relies heavily on autodidactic learning. It is a place 
of self-direction. The institutions of the library and the laboratory are at the 
heart of it. Compared with this, most contemporary universities offer a form of 
'higher schooling.' The discovery university is defined not by the transmission of 
knowledge but by the adventurous finding of knowledge. Its first task is creation. 
Its second task is to prepare those who one day will do the same. Classically this 
is achieved by self-education supported by the superlative modelling of creative 
action.10 The auto-poietic archetype of learning is borne out by a century of 
studies of creative cohorts in the arts, sciences and the professions. Discovery is 
the apprehension of previously unobserved relations and forms. It manifests itself 
in learning, teaching, research, and innovation. While discovery is not identical 
to research, research typically accompanies discovery-based learning. The chief 
medium of both is the imagination. Research and discovery-based learning call 
upon similar capacities. Both require high levels of autonomy and both are marked 
by a strong propensity to objectivation, that is, the positing of intellectual and 
symbolic objects. These range from undergraduate research essays and reports 
through the graduate thesis to the book, artwork, model, exhibit, patent, and paper. 
Through the post-industrial era, social engineering decimated the ecology and 
media of the imagination both in the universities and in the larger society. The 
10 Albert Jay Nock, 1932: 73, observed: 'Let us speak of the university and the 
undergraduate college. Traditionally, the university was an association of scholars, grouped 
in four faculties Literature, Law, Theology and Medicine. When I say an association of 
scholars, I mean that it was not quite precisely what we understand by a teaching institution. 
The interest of the students was not the first interest of the institution. Putting it roughly, 
the scholars were busy about their own affairs, but because the Great Tradition had to be 
carried on from generation to generation, they allowed certain youngsters to hang about 
and pick up what they could; they lectured every now and then, and otherwise gave the 
students a lift when and as they thought fit. The point is that the whole burden of education 
lay on the student, not on the institution or on the individual scholar. Traditionally, also, the 
undergraduate college put the whole burden of education on the student. The curriculum 
was fixed, he might take it or leave it ... Moreover, he had to complete it pretty well on 
his own, there was no pressure of any kind upon an instructor to get him through it, or to 
assume any responsibility whatever for his progress, or to supply any adventitious interest 
in his pursuits. The instructor usually did make himself reasonably helpful, especially in 
the case of those whom he regarded as promising, but it was no part of the institution's 
intention or purpose that he should transfer any of the actual burden of education from the 
student's shoulders to his own, or contribute anything from his own fund of interest in his 
subject by way of making up for any deficiency of interest on the part of the student.' 
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consequence of this is that the kinds of eccentric, wide-ranging, free-wheeling, 
difficult and demanding intellectual modes, milieu and means-necessary for 
the brightest of the bright from all backgrounds to flourish-have diminished. 
In all but a handful of universities, these often-astringent intellectual methods 
have been replaced by the pedestrian media of the textbook, the unread weekly 
reading, and the content-starved power-point-driven lecture course. The latter 
deliver on fiercely audited political goals to increase social mobility and promote 
status-climbing by increasing 'participation' in higher education but these also 
marginalize and trivialize high-level intellectual formation and bore senseless 
the most intellectually-gifted students. In the end, a paradox is created. Everyone 
wants to have the glittering prize but to achieve that goal the glittering prize has 
to be destroyed. 
There are a number of practical ways by which nations and universities can 
reverse this situation. The intent of proposing these is to overcome the tyranny 
of tedium that has been unleashed on the gifted, to find ways of re-birthing the 
media of the imagination at the heart of the university and in the wider society 
and restore a congenial place for adventurous minds. Rather than post-modem 
'participation,' 'access' and 'mobility,' which have become tiresome cliches (rolled 
out by glib political actors) or worse still meritocratic dystopias (promoted by 
over-professionalized ghouls), there is a need today to think about pathways and 
destinations for the modest numbers of bright or highly-curious individuals, many 
of whom (in their student days) will fail exams, drop out, write papers that are out 
of their depth but for whom intellectual excitement and audacity matters, and who 
we know (from the evidence of very good studies) in the end will form a small but 
socially-essential cohort who are highly creative and who deliver virtually all of 
the lasting and transmittable achievements across the arts and sciences, in business 
and the professions. 
